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The Amer ica n Bar Found at i on's most recent statistical Profile
of the United sta t e s Lega l Pro f ession demonstrates the significance
of in-house cor porate counse l within the legal profession .
At
present, a full 10 % o f t he attorneys are employed in private
industry, total l ing over 55 , 000 attorneys.
About half of these
attorneys (or approximat e ly 25 , 000) were employed by either Fortune
500 firms or firms in the top 50 in various industry categories.
3 2 % of the attorneys in private industry worked in companies with
a legal staff of over 50 .
Yet, these numb ers do not capture the true nature of the
In a d dition to just numbers, the quality of the work
e v olution.
b e ing performed has undergone a significant change.
Before, the
paradigm was one of r~utine--- i n-house counse~ did the ~ork th~t
the law firm lawyers dldn't want to do. Certalnly that plcture 1S
no longer corr ect .
More and more sUbstantive work---including
Ii tigation--- is being performed by the corporation's own attorneys.
What then should be said a bout the ethical dimension to this
evolving sector of the practice?
To begin our understanding of
this topic, a few obser vations about the nature of the work is in
order.
All a r e e x p res s ed in terms of what corporate counsel are
not---thus emphasizing the difference with the law firm a ttorney.
1-- The Lawyer as Non-Independent Contractor. The attorney is more
clearly employed by the client- entity (who is signing his check)
than is the lawyer in a firm who at least functionally works for
the firm who in turn is working for the client-entity.
Whether
this makes any different is a difficult question, but the
difference in form is at least potentially significant.
2---The Non-Transaction Nature of the Representation. The in-house
attorney's work is not usually compensated on a per hour basis or
even on a per task basis.
This is perhaps the clearest
manifestation of a fundamentally different model of representation.
A corporate law department is not a profit center as is a private
law firm. Indeed, one rather cyn i cal business manager referred to
his company's legal staff as "the Department of Prof it Prevention."
Law firms have a market-driven check on their performance---how
much money are clients paying us each year over and above any
malpractice liabil~ty :that we have? Given the lack of paying work,
it becomes more dlfflcult to assess in a tangible manner "how
things are going . "
3---The Importance of Non-Legal Advice. The work to be performed
tends to be more prospective a s planning is often involved.
Perhaps the best short-hand description is that an in-house
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attorney's job is to facilitate the business side's work. As such,
the line between the attorney's legal role and non-legal "business"
issues is less distinct than in law firm practice.
Thus as Eve
. Spangler has recently remarked in her book on "Lawyers for Hire,"
the lawyer's involvement in clearing a business deal "shades by
imperceptible degrees into availability as a sounding board for the
business person's ideas . .
"
4---The Non-firm structure. The organization of the corporate law
department is not nearly as uniform as the partner/associate
structure of the law firm.
centralization and "lines of command"
vary according to the industry and dictates of the individual
general counsel.
Opportun i ties
for
"promotion"
organized
differently as there is less of a sense of up or out.
Prospects
for getting what my law firm's partners called "the big bucks" are
probably less.
other differences in the hiring/firing/paying
system exist such as non-lawyer review and lateral entry into the
business side of the same corporation.
Given the above factors, how then do we beg in to fit th i 5
segment of the legal profession into the legal ethics frameworks
developed over the years? Regrettably, one does not find much help
in the formal legal codes. Putting the ethical issue in hi stor ic al
focus in terms of formal "ethical codes" does not take much time at
all--there simply is not much to talk about. All the pro fessi on al
codes through to the early 1970s basically assumed a mod e l of an
attorney in a private law firm who primarily handled lit iga tion.
This ethical system had two major attributes.
First, th e e thic al
rules presupposed that there was a process by which an atto rney was
retained by a client to perform a given service. Many cor ol laries
flowed from this seemingly straightforward proposition:
(1) there
was a need for clients to obtain information about the unive rse of
attorneys and select one; (2) the question of fees need ed to be
resolved; (3) the attorney had leeway whether to accept or reject
~he representation; (4) attorneys would have many cli ents ; (5 )
lssues relating to termination must be addressed; (6) the codes
must also deal with representing conflicting interests.
Second, the ethical codes established loyalty to the clie nt as
the primary attribute of the profession .
At the same ti me , th e
codes could pay lip service to public interest by defin i ng th e
public interest as being a "zealous advocate" for your cli ent since
from the battle of advocates "truth" would emerge.
The advocacy
model seems to presuppose litigation as the only role to be played
by lawyers. Within this model, at least the facade of ind epe ndenc e
w~s maintained.
A lawyer could go full out on your client s behalf
wlthout buying into their values. After all, you had many clie nt s,
and by speaking for one, you were not speaking for the others or
yourself .
. There is just one problem--this model has next to no thi ng to
do Wlth most corporate counsel's legal professionalism.
The oneon-one advocacy model simply does not work for a large number of
lawyers. As stated by Geoffrey Hazard, "For the lawyer retained by
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an organization such as a corporation . . . , identifying the client
is much more complicated.
Client identity is ambiguous,
co ntinuously problematic, and requires resolution by conscious
choice."
Hazard, Ethics in the Practice of Law (1978)
The old
Codes then gave worse than no guidance. Rather, they assumed that
most of the "representational" problems were resolved at the
beg inning of the representation.
Who was paying the bill was
generally the ~lient- - -that pers~n is embraced in a close
relationship, wh1le everyone else 1S put at an arms' length or
fur ther. Yet, as Hazard remarked, "in the real world, the identity
of the client may not be established until after some critical
deci sions have to b~ made, and may never be unambiguously
established at all." Id.
And what then of those "client-like" non-clients? It happens
all the time---the estate lawyer dealing with a family yet writing
the will for one spouse.
Yet, our rules talk about clients as if
they are to be held and cherished like your mother in old age, and
"non-clients" who should be viewed with skepticism and at least
occasionally loathing.
"When the prospective primary client is
uncertain how to define his own relationship to the other person in
the transaction, the lawyer's position is inevitably tentative and
am biguous. "
Id. See generally Jonas, Who is the Client?:
The
Corporate Lawyer's Dilemma, 39 Hastings L. J. 617 (1988); McCall,
The corporation as Client:
Problems, Perspectives, and Partial
Solutions, 39 Hastings L. J. 623 (1988).
The key problem of corporate legal ethics revolves rather
tightly around the question "who is the client" for the corporate
c ounsel. What's fair to say is this---we began this decade with a
ve ry poor conception of the corporate counsel's ethical role. We
a re now experimenting with a new effort at definition as defined by
Rul e 1.13 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
This
provision of the Model Rules went through several drafts during an
i ntensely political debate ove~ its provisions.
See Riger, The
Model Rules and Corporate Pract~ce: New Ethics for a Competitive
Era, 17 Conn. L. Rev. 729 (1985).
As the corporate counsel
profession comes of age, we can expect further change and
evolution. Serious criticism of the new approach detailed in Model
Rule
1.13
have
been raised.
See Mitchell,
Professional
Re sponsibility and the Close Corporation:
Toward a Realistic
Ethic, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 466 (1989).
saying someone is your client is really a shorthand expression
that you are operating ~n the behalf of someone or something else
as opposed to your own 1nterests. In a sense, this characteristic
is captured by the notion of loyalty, which in many respects is
fundamental. As a second attribute, there is a strong notion that
this loyalty characteristic is meant to operate to the exclusion of
a similar loyalty interest to a sometimes poorly defined group of
other interests.
This notion is captured by the concept of
"conflict of interest."
The

basic

problems

of

determining

representation

in

the
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corporate context are explored in Problem One which is attached.
In reading through the problems, consider whether the corporate
counsel acted properly in dealing with the company's President who
was being forced out of the company by other shareholders.
The
facts are based upon the recent decision of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in Robertson v. Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett,
536 N.E.2d 344 (1989) (reversing $500,000 judgment against attorney
who played role similar to that of the corporate attorneys in the
problem.
When everything is working right in a company, the busines s
managers view the law department as "part of the team, not
intruders to be viewed with suspicion."
This view causes many
commentators great concern. These lawyers cannot be "trusted ll to
protect the private interest---they are too loyal.
There is no
sense of independence, or separa·tion. That presents two important
questions: Is "independence" an important professional virtue for
lawyers, and, if so, is there something about the nature of the inhouse attorney's work that makes it largely unattainable?
See
generally Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 Boston U. L. Rev.
1 (1988). Consider the following quote from one law firm partner:
It is not uncommon for us to tell the president that he's a
turkey.
You know:
"You're a damn fool, and you've got an
environmental problem right now and you've got to spend a
million dollars to fix it even though it will lose you money
this year, or you're going to go to jail. That's the magnitude
of your problem. I'd like to hear an in-house lawyer say that
to a president who just had a stockholders' meeting where he's
promised the world. I'd like to see an in-house lawyer tell his
board of directors that his president is violating the Foreign
Corporate Practices Act. The fact is, there's just no room for
wilful blindness at that level. If you have both loyalties and
accountability to the superior, you can't be independent ...
What this quote exhibits is a serious criticism about the
"overloyalty" of in-house corporate attorneys, and somewhat clear
suggestions that the law firm attorney---with the added separation
that the firm structure gives him---is somehow "more ethical." Nor
is the point made only by law firm attorneys:
The literature in
this field has a number of quotes from general counsels to th e
following effect: "I always feel I have one hat, and this is: I
am a corporate office who happens to be a lawyer." The argument
can be recast in a slightly altered form as follows:
In the
business world, the lawyer's ethic of risk prevention will
inalterably be in conflict with the entrepreneurial ethic of ri sk
taking.
At first blush, the concern being expressed here is troubling.
All professionals are supposed to be "independent" aren't th ey?
Yet, the legal profession has never really been very serious about
independence as a professional norm, especially when measured
alongside loyalty. Unlike the accounting profession, lawyers have
done little to insure a meaningful sense of independence. Ind eed,
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the attorney-client relationship is in some respects the antithesis
of the CPA role. The lawyers' job is not typically conceptualized
as that of a "public watchdog", but rather as a facilitator of the
client's objectives. Constraints on advocacy or the limitations on
assisting the client often come from non-ethical considerations.
How then do we measure this corporate lawyer's contribution in
ethical terms? The ethical justification for the increase in inhouse counseling must be found, if it is to be found anywhere, is
the Model Rule's reorientation towards competence. See Model Rule
1.1.
The true measure of the in-house then becomes the in-house
attorney's relative competence on the key issues versus the firm
lawyer's competence. Is the nature of the in-house practice likely
to result in greater competence?
This is the type of qu est ion
which the legal profession is not very good about asking, much less
answering.
Maybe each has some advantages---greater breadth of
experience in the outside firm which may be useful in some
situations. But the key issue is competence, and in this context,
my guess is that it relates to two additional critical concerns not
often discussed in an ethics course:
specialization and cost.
Loyalty has never been penalized for being too muc h in
abundance.
Yet, it does create some problems in the corporate
context.
The strength of the loyalty runs to many potentially
different clients. Yet, this is not unique to in-house attorneys.
The real question is what happens when the interests are in
conflict.
The diff icul ty of answering the question "who is the
client" is in a sense a shorthand for a very different, and
ultimately more important question:
"How are we going to handle
conflicts of interest in this context?"
The primary conflict of interest rule (Model Rule 1.7) works
better when you're an attorney considering whether to take on a
client in the relative quiet of your office. The Rules want you to
investigate the new client and see if his/her or its interests are
adverse to somebody you are already representing. If its a group
of people who are hiring counsel, the Rules want you to analyze
whether you can do the job for everybody. This is well and good,
but does it help in-house corporate attorneys? Consider the usual
scenario -- We already know we've got the one "big" client---the
company. We are not considering whether to "add" that client to an
existing portfolio.
All of a sudden some issue comes along, and
someone with a legitimate claim to the loyalty of the company (to
whom we owe loyalty both individually and professionally through
the derivative relationship with the corporate client).
That
person asks us, the company's lawyers, for help. What do you do?
/

If your omniscient, you can look into the crystal ball and see
where the matter will eventually lead.
Is this really a~y
different than the private lawyer? The private practice lawyer ln
uncertain cases has a rather useful tool to help him or her decide--ask the existing client.
No conflict rule can ever be precise
enough to tell you what to do.
By definition, the inquiry is
subjective and speculative. The rules try to put order onto chaos,
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and malpractice rules, disciplinary rules, and the like are making
this pressure even greater . The corporate representation situation
is perhaps the most amorphous of al l.
These are people seeking
help who have a legitimate moral claim to assistance or at least
explanation . They are acting on behalf of the company.
Is there
a way to conduct· an analysis? This is clearly an emerging area of
law that is far from settled.
The potential for major ethical
mistakes exist and will become even more serious as corporate
counsel go further into litigation acti vi ties.
See Reycraft
I

Conflicts of Interest and Effecti ve Repre sentation:
Corporate Counsel, 39 Hastings L. J . 605 (1988 ).

The Dilemma of

There is a clear need for educating those around you about the
nature of the corporate representation.
Lawyers often do not
understand that it is primarily their responsibility to clarify the
relationship.
Developing a good understanding requires a
sensitivity to conceptualizing the problem as one of multiple
representation as opposed to a pure conflict.
For example,
consider a sex discrimination sui t against a company supervisor
wi th both the company and the supervisor named as defendants. When
the claim is initially made (assume its before a lawsuit is even
filed)
it looks like the claim is lacking in merit, although maybe
not frivolous. You hate to go out and hire a separate attorney for
both the company and the supervisor. So you use the legal staff t o
"represent" both. Can you even do this? Almost clearly yes if you
satisfy the basic Model Rule 1.7 construction, i.e. (1) the lawyer
does not believe that it is directly adverse; and (2) consent of
both clients after consultation.
The possibility exists for a
potential disaster.
The supervisor is found individually liable
for something under some state law theory. The supervisor may well
seek to assert a malpractice based upon a conflict of interest.
I

How can this be avoided? Always having separate counsel is
expensive.
Can the company even pay for separate counsel?
The
answer here is yes.
See Comment, Rule 1.7:
"So, also, when a
corporation and its directors or employees are involved in a
controversy in which they have conflicting interests,
the
corporation may provide funds for separate legal representation of
the directors or employees,
if the clients consent after
consultation and the arrangement ensures the lawyers' professional
independence." It is thus essential that an attorney (1) recognize
the potential concern; (2) make a formal analysis under Rule 1.7
that your judgment is that one lawyer can represent both ; and (3)
make disclosures so that individual's client's judgment is
exercised based upon good information. Some attorneys go further
and obtain independent counsel to analyze the Rule 1.7 question.
Basic problems with the role of corporation counsel are
evident from a number of judicial decisions drawn from a variety o f
contexts. For example, in the area of wrongful d ischarge, courts
have taken a basic view that in-house attorneys are essentially
similar to outside counsel so that the "client"--the corporation-has the ability to fire counsel with or without cause. Thus, most
courts have held that in-house counsel have no claim for wrongful
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d ischarge. See willy v. Coastal, 64 7 F.Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986);
b ter v . North American Company, 150 Ill. App.3d 21, 501 N.E.2d
Her 5(19 8 6)
A recent decision from the Illinois Court of Appeal
343.
'
"
t
'
ts that there mayan exceptlon ln those Clrcums ances ln
sugges
,
f
'
1
1
1
See
wh i c h the corporate attorney lS per ormlng a non- ega ro e. ___
Ba lla v. Bambro, Inc . , 1990 Ill. App . LEXIS 1376 (Sept. 10, 1990).
This line of decisions s~ggests that courts have s~me
lin g e ring uncertainty ~nd, confuslon abo u t the natur~ of the 1~
ho use counse l 's role wlthln ~h~ company.
Court remaln uncerta~n
ab out such issues as the abl1 l ty of In-house counsel to obtaln
o ther jobs in the mar~etplace, their ability to "blow t~e whist~e"
'''' i thout suffer ing ser 10US adverse consequences. For an lnterestlng
a nalysis of the wrongful di scharge cases as well as other cases
fr om other contexts in which courts have analyzed the roles played
by c orporate counsel, s ee Schneyer, Professionalism and Pui?lic
Pol icy: The Case o f House Counsel , 2 Georgetown J. Legal EthlCS,
449 (1988).
A final, and critical issue, relates to corporate counsel's
d uties of confident iality.
In o rder to focus the discussion, a
hy pothetical problem is attached . This problem presents a number
of ethical issues faced by an attorney representing a corporation.
The earlier Codes (i.e. the Canons of Professional Ethics and the
Hodel Code of Professional Resp on si bility) did not deal very
clearly with attorneys representi ng entities as opposed to
individuals.
The new Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules), on the other hand, make a significant attempt to focus the
a ttorney's ethical respon~ibilities when representing an entity.
See Model Rule 1.1,3., ,Tt;ls ~elatively new attempt to define the
attorney's responslb llltles lS of great significance and indeed
may be the most important substantive addition brought about by th~
Model Rules.
As you
questions:

read

through

the

problem,

consider

the

following

( 1) Who do you represent?
The ~odel Rules prov,ide ~n Model Rule 1.13 that an attorney
representlng ~n organl~atlon llke a corporation represents not the
i ndi viduals lnvol ved ln that , organization but the organIZation
i tself. Thus, throughout the dlS~Ussion with Mr. Treasurer, Connor
was acting as the attorney fO,r F,lr,stData, not the attorney for Mr.
Treasurer or Mr. McEnroe as lndlvlduals.
(2) Can Connor can assist Treasurer R. MCEnroe?
We must reference Model Rule 1.13 as a starting point and
then proceed from the re., ,A pr';ldent attorney faced with' this
i nformation, should at a mlnlmum flrst advise Mr. Treasurer that he
i s the attorney for the corporation. Rul e 1.13, however, does not
proscribe an attorney for a corporation representing an officer
individually. Rather, Rule 1.13(e) references Rule 1.7 concerning
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is
repr senting conflicting interests . While a contrary
in
7
posslble,
Rule 1.7 would seem to preclude joint representa lclude
this case.
It is doubtful that an attorney could con, marY
representing Mr. Treasurer would not "adversely affect" the prl
representation.
t

argu~7~n

(3) What actions do you take?
Rule 1.13 creates a rich array of factors for the corporate
attorney to consider including:
th violatio n
,
a
.
The
seriousness
and
conse
uences
of
e
,the
~~volved.( ) Are the violations here criminal acts? What '~ved?
lkely effect on the company of disclosure? How much is invo a bl~
Does" it r ea 11 y put the corporatlon'
"
, n ln,
'
that unten
s posltlo
' ' ation
posltlc:>n. Has the practice stopped? What is the 11kely lltlg
scenarlOS and outcomes?
,
IS i t

(b). The scope of the attorney's representatl0n. ;~ no t
position to. comment? sometimes , the matter involved >~tent
e l~wyers' buslness. This provides outside counsel. The e s to
to WhlCh the attorney has the ability influence, and resource
,
"get to the bottom of the problem"
"to take it to the top" lS
relevant to the ethical analysis.
An outside counsel who, has
a traffic case last year simplY isn't going, to uebe
posltlon to command much respect when the he takes the lss
t
Board of Directors.
corporate counsel almost inevitably are is
such a position.
e
n
(c) .
The res onsibilit
in the or anizatio
and tt:
_
_
_
_
' r sus
apparent motivation of the "guilty"
parties.
This factors
lS
supposed to be getting at some notion of personal galn ve
"go o d" mo t'lves for bad actions.
n
(d) .
The
olicies of the or anizatio
problems. What does the company say it should do in

i~ur

han~17d

o~

:~h:

A few basic observations are warranted.
At a minimum, the
attorney should not get involved in the fraud. More fundamentall y
~he a,ttorney should insist that any fraudulent practices s~op
lmmedlately.
The ethical codes have always drawn a clear 11ne
between past acts and future acts.
I

,Wit~out defining an answer as to hoW Rule 1.13 shou~d ~e
applled ln this case it is clear that t he Rule 1.13 analYS1S 1S
far more lik~ly to re~ult in the inside lawyer having an ob~igati on
to do somethlng than it is for the outside attorney. cons1der the
following points.
,The in-house counsel will seldom have a "know nothing I see
nothlng, do nothing" argument as is provided to outside lawyers
~nder the "scope and nature of the representation" argument. The
~n-house counsel is dead solid on the bulls-eye when it comes to
lnvolvement with the company.
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The in-hous e counsel is likely to have superior information
(both in terms of the c ompany ' s "r~les" for r:andling probl e ms both
formal and informal, and respect1ng the llkely consequences of
disclosure) than the outside counsel. The in-hous e counsel wil l be
less likely to fool himself into thinking this is a minor problem.
Thus
the same problem will in my vi e w be perceived as a more
seri~us problem with more negative effects by an in-house attorney
than by regular outside cou nsel.
This superior knowledge will eff ect all the factors set forth
above, and tend towards the need to do more.
Rule 1.13 sets forth a p reci se, a nd relatively clear approach
that the attorney is required to take.
The limited disclosure
requirements under Rule 1.13(b) are triggered when a lawyer knows
that an officer of the corporation is engaged in action that (1)
violates the law and (2) which "is like l y to result in sUbstantial
harm" to the company .
Both conditions would appear to be met in
this case.
Once the attorney concludes that there is a serious
violation likely to result in substantial harm to the corporation,
Model Rule 1.13 requires that the attorney "shall proceed as is
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization."
While there are certainly some potentia l ambiguities in this
formulation, it is crystal clea r t hat the relevant focus is on the
c ompany and not t hat of the individuals.
Often this require s
referring the matter to the corporation's Board of Directors for
action.
If no sUfficient response is ach ieved, the attorney's
ultimate choice is resignation .
See Hemmer, Resignation of
Cor pora te Counsel: Fulfillment or Abdication of Duty, 39 Hastings
L. J . 641 (1988).
(4).

Can you keep that convers ation conf idential?

As you think about how to respond , consider who it is tha t can
waive the privilege relating to the conversation. Pre-QP.john, the
quest~on would have sparked a debat~.
After Upjohn, there is no
quest10n that the attorney is work1ng only for the corporation.
There is also no question that Connor's conversation with Treasurer
is protected by the attorney-client privilege based upon the
client-attorney relationship between Connors and FirstData.
The
issue then arises as to who can waive that privilege?
This
que~t~on is ,obv~ousl y of critical , i~portance to Treasurer who has
exh1~1 ted h1S 1nterest in mainta1 n1ng ,c omplete conf identia 1 i ty.
The 1mportant point to recognize here 1S that despite hi s clear
in~e~est
~n
confidenti ality,
the applicable attorney-client
pr 1 v1lege 1S not subj ect to his c o~t~ol.
Fi rstData, or indeed
others, may decide t.o waive the pr1v1lege which will re sult in
making co~nors obligated to respond, if ~ubpoenaed, to discus s the
conversat10n. In a sense , thi s observat1on merely underscores the
central theme of the entire problem that Connors is the attorney
for the r0rr0r~~;0n, and not for individual.
The potential complications relating to waiver are well
demonstrated in Commodity Futures Tradinq Commission v. Weintraub,

1
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became
oration federal
a corp fter a
d for
d't Futures,
A
f' le
471 U.S. 343 (1984).
In Commo ~ y,
est~ation.
it
~ rustee.
the target of a federal government ~nv
companY', ted a '1' d itS
,
t
the
agency filed a complaint aga~ns
tally apP o~n contl.'nue
ttorneY
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court eve~ Ugovernment anY' s ~ruptcY·
Despite the bankruptcy, the federa
d the cOmPthe ban laiming
investigation, and eventually subpoena e d ~ to tions c
seeking information on events the occurr~anti ve qu eS
The attorney refused to answer any subs
panY'S
the attorney-client privilege.
,
the c om
the
re
to Yla~",:,e
Bef o tor of
The government then asked the Trus;;e~stee dl.d ·nd dir ec '1'his
attorney-client privilege, which the
~ officer \vileqe
ruled
attorney could testify, however, a for:m~ain the pr rt \Vhl.Cfore ~
the company told that attorney to ma~n
reme coud there Yler to
issue eventually worked itself to the SU~anY' s an d the P~ee had
that the privilege was only that of the, CO~ightS' h~he '1'r usver the
Trustee, who succeeded to the company s h ld that
even 0
waive the privilege. The Supreme co~rt erivilege
the power to waive the attorney-cl~ent p
'f he
Objection of the former officers.
er (even c~h as
sur
' g SU
hat '1'r ea
eedl. n 'vileg e ,
Thus, in this case, it seems clear ~ some proc the pr~ d Ylaive
should someday want Connors to testify ~n
t Ylai ve t coul
n
to prove his lack of malicious intent), can ? _interes
but that FirstData itself or its successo~-~~ions.
the privilege even over M~Officer's obJe c

b
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DISCUSSION PROBLEM 1
Christie curta in Co. was founded in 1925 by Charles Christie.
The old corporatio n, whose primary business was manufacturing
c urtain s, had as its principal customer Sears, Roebuck & Co. while
o r ig inally a fami ly business, Christie curtain had grown so that
t here were both family members and non-fami ly members active in all
l evels of management.
Thomas Shelton, was hired as christie Curtain's general
c ouns el in 198 3. Prior to that time, Shelton had been at the law
fi rm of pickens & Dooley, where he had worked on a number of
~ atters for Christie curtain.
The work performed had been wide
ra nging, and included individual representation of some of the
mem bers of the christie fa mily in a variety of areas such as estate
pla nning. ~elevant to this probl~m, Shelto~ had drafted a will for
J o el Christle, the youngest son ln the famlly,
In mid-1989, Charles Christie asked Shelton to investigate the
p oss ibility of a major corporate reorga nization of Christie
c ur t a in, in pa rt motivated by his own estate planning needs . The
ba sic plan called for t h e sale of all the old corporation's assets
o a n~w corporat ion , Christie I ndustries, which would be owned not
o nly by Christie family me mbers but by seni or, non-family members
o f the current manag ement team.
When this plan was discussed with Sears, Christie's major
c lie nt, Sears sought as s urances that Joel Christie, then President
o f Christie curtai ns, would not control the new corporation and
would be placed in a different position in the company owing to
o ng -standing probl ems between Sears and Joel.
Instead, Sears
wa nted a non- fam ily member, will Washburn, to become president.
~ his demand was acceptable to Charles Christie and other family
, embe rs who had more than enough votes to effect this change. At
the next meeting o f the Board, Washburn was elected President and
Chief Executive Officer.
At this point, Joel went to see Shelton to discuss his
c once rns with the proposed reorganization plan, which was actively
b eing pursued by Shelton and outside counsel retained to draft the
nec essary documents.
Joel asked Shelton whether he was going to
rec ei ve an employment contract with the new company.
Shelton
ind icated that the question was a reasonable one, but that he was
n ot aware,of management's plans. Shelton agreed that he would put
the questlon of employment contracts for various individuals on the
ag enda for the next planning meeting.
Shelton also gave Joel a
c o py of a form employment contract fr om another company that he had
i n h~s files. They also had a general con~ersation about the types
o f 1 tems that are typically included ,In long-term employment
c ontrac ts.
Several days later
Joel clrcu lated a memo to the
o ffic ers of the corporation with~ copy to Shelton raising a number
o f co ncerns with the proposed reorganization.
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iza ti0 11 ,
the reorg an
have
Prior to the closing with respect to
loyees woul<:
n ot
Washburn informed Shelton that none of th~ emp Shelton dl-d
long-term contracts with the new corporatl- on .
disclose this information to Joel .
,
tpe
89
FollOWl-ngther
The closing took place on December 30, ~9
. Joel's br o o 11g
closing, Joel owned 22.5% of the new corporatl-~~~ dispersed am t S
also owned 22.5% with the rest of the owners l- loyment contrac
non-family members. The question of l ong - term em-g four
r
o e
was not raised at the closing.
In Jan uary, 199h~r controlled m t O
non-family members and Joel's brother (wh o to<iJet) asked 5hel ton t e
than 50% of the shares in the new corporatl- on i natories to vOe e
draft a voting agreement that would requ i re the s o~ted by any t;:-hr 5 '
for any candidate for the Board of Directors SUbPt asked the ~l-rm ot
of the signatories. Shelton prepared a draft , U Shelton dl-d n 1 n
outs ide law firm to consummate the agreementt ' ng agreement.
to
inform Joel or Charles Christie about the vo l-poration vote? on
February, 1990, the directors of the new co~ to replace hl-m
terminate Joel's employment with t he c ompany an
the Board of Directors.
eth iCs
t he
; on and an in
t
ac
Joel has filed a legal ma lprac ti c e h i s
actl-O ns
complaint against Shelton based upo n
reorganization as described above .
I a11d
,
between Joe
to
Was there an attorney-cli e n t r e l at i o n shl-P al duties owed d
Shelton? Has Shelton breached any ethica l or; ~~~entlY if yOU ha
Joel?
What actions would you have t a ken dl-f
been Shelton?
.L

,

DISCUSSION PROBLEM TWO
,
ata, a modest-si ~ed
George Connors is general counsel to Fl-r stO d data proceSS l-ng
company involved in selling word processing an years ago aft er
systems.
Connors came to FirstData about twO ars with a large
having been in private practice for several Y~porate deals f or
downtown law firm.
He had worked on several , cOed the people an
FirstData when he was with the firm.
He enJoYhis liking, so he
thought the opportunities there were more to I when it presented
accepted an offer to become their general counse
itself.
's comptroller, has
This morning, John Treasurer, Firstoat;:-a ediately.
conno~ s
called Connors asking if they could meet l-mm, s voice.
John l-S
agreed, but detected a note of concern in John
and they wor
one of Connors' closest friends at Firstoata,
together frequently.
,
upset.
He shut the
When Treasurer arrl-ved, he was visl-blY t
was experienc ing
door, and began by telling George that Firs toa aould lead "to mor e
financial difficulties which, if not corrected, w
r
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ser ious problems."
The problem began several years ago when
FirstData's President and largest stockholder, Mark McEnroe, began
a series of highly questionable financing arrangements. Like any
growth company in a high tech field, FirstData had tremendous
capital needs.
Frequently, they would lease a computer system to
a client on a long-term lease and at the same time enter into a
financing arrangement with a bank that would loan the money to
purchase the hardware.
The lease payments from the client would
then be used to service the loan and provide FirstData with a
profit.
Mr. Treasurer now disclosed that McEnroe had intentionally
overstated the value of the computer systems in order to obtain
larger loans.
The excess proceeds from the loans were then used
for general expansion . At first, the overstatements were modest,
but have increased over time. ' Several of the initial leasing
agreements were now expiring. After expiring, many customers would
return their computer systems, at which time the systems would be
valued.
It seemed quite likely to Mr. Treasurer that once this
valuation was made, the fraud would be uncovered. He thought that
perhaps the situation could be handled secretly for a while since
t~e com~any had adequate cash to keep paying off the loans for the
tlme belng at least.
A~ the details were unveiled, it became clear to Mr. Connors
that hlS old firm had closed many of the loan transactions and may
wel~ have been negligent in investigating the value of the computer
equlpment.

Mr .

Treasurer

could

not

specify the

total

amount of

the

o~er~tated value, but thought perhaps it was as high as $4.5
m~lllon, but could be lower.
He was corning to Mr. Connors at this

tlme becaUse he was concerned with the effect of the disclosure on
th~ comp~ny's relationship with its Bank.
While McEnroe was the
prlmar¥ lnstigator of the plan, Treasurer , and others, had known
about lt and had helped to keep it going.
Treasur~r then asked Connors to adVl' se h'1m on how to proceed
to protec~ h~mself McEnroe and FirstData. Treasurer also insists
that ~he ~nformat{on be ke~t confidential since disclosure would
certalnly harm th e company.
What can or
?
Is he ethically obligated to
keep the infor t~ust Connors do.
confidential, and if so, from
whom?
Is h ,ma ~on he has learned
att o ~ney-cl' ~s conversation with Treasurer ,protected by the
~ent privileg?
If so who can walve the privilege?
Wha
t 1aredConn
"glven
t ha t h'lS prlor
,
,
,
'
or's ethicale.obll'gations
flrm
was
1nvo ve In th e past financial transac t'10 ns a t '1ssue.?

